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On Preferences and Promises: 
A Response to Harsanyi 
Donald Regan 
John C. Harsanyi sketches an entire normative and metaethical theory 
in under twenty pages.' Combining breadth and brevity, his essay is 
useful and interesting. It reveals the interrelations between Harsanyi's 
positions on various issues as no longer work or series of articles could 
do. But by virtue of its programmatic nature, the essay creates a dilemma 
for a commentator, at least for one who finds many things to disagree 
with. If I responded to Harsanyi in the same sweeping terms in which 
he argues, we would end up with little more than opposing assertions. 
At the other extreme, I could point out what seem to me particular 
defects in Harsanyi's arguments as they stand. But that would seem 
pedantic and ungenerous if my particular objections could be avoided 
by spelling out his arguments at greater length, as some of them surely 
could. (I am especially troubled by this possibility because I am persuaded 
that in the past I once misinterpreted an argument of Harsanyi's and 
treated it unjustly.)2 Constraints of space prevent me from first spelling 
out Harsanyi's arguments as best I can and then criticizing them. 
Accordingly, I shall limit myself to two topics, chosen partly because 
I think the observations I shall make are worth making whether or not 
they represent points of ineliminable disagreement between Harsanyi 
and myself. 
I 
Assuming that the basic point of morality is to bring it about that people's 
preferences are satisfied, Harsanyi says that "we cannot always use a 
person's observable preferences as our final criterion for his or her true 
interests" (p. 43). Rather, we should concern ourselves with people's true 
preferences, that is, with what they would prefer if they were fully informed 
and perfectly logical. 
It is important to ask at this point just what sort of preferences 
Harsanyi is willing to dismiss as misguided. Is he taking the sort of 
1. John C. Harsanyi, "Does Reason Tell Us What Moral Code to Follow and, Indeed, 
to Follow Any Moral Code at All?" in this issue; further citations to this essay will be in 
parentheses in the text. 
2. See below, A Coda on Coordination. 
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position Richard Brandt takes?3 Is he willing to throw out even such a 
fundamental preference as some adult's desire for artistic achievement, 
if, say, it can be shown that this preference was acquired as a result of 
childhood misperceptions about the means of or the importance of pleasing 
one's parents? Or is Harsanyi thinking only of instrumental preferences 
such as Jones's observable desire to go to Chicago, which is misguided 
because the reason Jones wants to go is to see his friend Brown, and 
Brown, unbeknownst to Jones, has moved to Los Angeles? 
If Harsanyi contemplates ignoring as misguided only instrumental 
preferences, like Jones's desire to go to Chicago, then much of what I 
have to say will be irrelevant; but by the same token, his theory will be 
much less ambitious than it might seem, and it will require us to maximize 
the satisfaction of people's ultimate preferences, whatever they are and 
however much they may be historically based on ignorance, illogic, or 
psychological domination. 
If, on the other hand, Harsanyi means, like Brandt, to subject even 
ultimate preferences to criticism by facts and logic-if he means to suggest 
that what is in a person's interest depends on what she would prefer 
after a course of cognitive psychotherapy-then I want to ask, Why? 
Why should we try to promote the satisfaction of people's "true" ultimate 
preferences, which are or may very well be hypothetical, instead of their 
observable ultimate preferences, which are actual? (Hereafter, whenever 
I speak of "preferences," I shall mean ultimate preferences.) 
The question may seem an odd one. My purpose in asking the 
question is not to cast doubt on the importance of what distinguishes 
true preferences from observable preferences. I agree that it is desirable 
to be as well-informed as possible and to think logically in deliberating 
about practical questions. My purpose is rather to cast doubt on the 
ability of someone like Harsanyi, who takes the satisfaction of preferences 
as the fundamental nonmoral good, to account for the importance of 
information, logic, and deliberation-in particular to explain why in- 
formation, logic, and deliberation matter in the formation of (ultimate) 
preferences, as opposed to the attempt to satisfy them. 
To begin with, the only (ultimate) preferences I actually have are 
my observable preferences, not my true preferences if those are different. 
If my true preferences and my observable preferences diverge, what is 
the good to me of the occurrence of events that satisfy my true preferences 
but that disappoint my actual desires? 
Faced with this question, Harsanyi might retreat one step. He might 
agree that, if a choice must be made between satisfying some agent's 
observable preferences and satisfying her true preferences, then it is her 
observable preferences that matter. But, he might add, the agent would 
be well-advised to deliberate about her preferences, or to get assistance 
3. Richard B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979), esp. chap. 6. 
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in deliberation in the form of cognitive psychotherapy, so as to bring 
her observable preferences as nearly into line with her true preferences 
as possible. But again, Why? 
The obvious answer is something along these lines: many of our 
preferences are misguided. They were encouraged historically by factual 
error, or they are the result of false ideals and inappropriate guilt feelings 
(or the like) acquired when we were under the sway of our parents. We 
have desires for things that give us no actual pleasure when we get them. 
And we have aversions to things that, if we were better informed or 
psychologically healthier, we would greatly enjoy. Deliberation will allow 
us to rid ourselves of these impediments to genuine happiness. 
There are two problems with this answer. For one thing, it is by no 
means a necessary truth that we will enjoy life more if we discover and 
act on our true preferences. For example, it may turn out that our true 
preferences are harder to satisfy than our observable ones. Deliberation 
may destroy preferences we can satisfy (and the satisfaction of which 
would in fact give us pleasure) and replace them with preferences we 
cannot satisfy, condemning us to frustration. 
Furthermore, the argument in favor of deliberation that I have 
suggested presupposes that the real good is not the satisfaction of our 
preferences, whether observable preferences or true preferences, but 
rather is the psychological enjoyment that, if we are fortunate, the sat- 
isfaction of our preferences produces. In other words, the argument for 
the superiority of true preferences presupposes that the real good is not 
preference satisfaction at all but is a particular sort of psychological 
experience. But it was precisely the inadequacy of a theory that posits 
only psychological experiences as the good that led philosophers to assert 
that the good was the satisfaction of preferences in the first place. If we 
abandon the psychological-experience theory of the good in favor of the 
preference-satisfaction theory, we cannot then turn around and use the 
quality of experience produced as the test for which preferences to satisfy. 
In sum, deliberation about one's ultimate preferences is desirable- 
even, I should say, morally required-but the theorist who takes preference 
satisfaction as the fundamental good has no satisfactory explanation of 
why. 
II 
I turn now to a different topic, the relative merits of rule utilitarianism 
and act utilitarianism. One of Harsanyi's charges against act utilitarianism 
is that act utilitarians are unable to maintain many socially useful practices, 
most particularly practices like promising, which involve the creation of 
expectations (sec. 2).4 I think Harsanyi is mistaken about this; act utilitarians 
4. Harsanyi distinguishes between an expectation effect and an incentive effect of 
practices like promising. The former has to do with the degree to which people can form 
beliefs and feel secure and confident about what will happen in their future. The latter 
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can have a practice of promising. (Promising is the only practice I shall 
discuss, but I believe most proponents of act utilitarianism and many 
opponents would agree that promising can be taken as representative of 
a considerable range of similar practices.) 
In my opinion, the issue of whether act utilitarians can influence 
expectations through a practice of promising is more complicated than 
Harsanyi makes it appear. I have discussed the matter at some length 
elsewhere, and I cannot discuss it fully here.5 What I can do here, without 
repeating anything I have said elsewhere, is to suggest that Harsanyi 
misrepresents the institution of promising, not only as it would function 
among act utilitarians, but even as it functions in commonsense morality. 
In criticizing Harsanyi on these lines, I am not criticizing him alone. His 
view of how promising works is widespread among philosophers. 
Imagine two friends, Damon and Pythias, who live in the same town 
and who see each other regularly. Damon and Pythias agree on Friday 
to meet for lunch the following Monday at their favorite Greek restaurant. 
Monday morning arrives, and Damon gets up late with a hangover. Not 
a terrible hangover, but enough of a hangover to make the prospect of 
the planned luncheon distinctly unappealing. Damon tries to telephone 
Pythias, without success. After brief reflection, he goes back to bed. He 
is breaking his promise, but he believes that he is justified in doing so 
under the circumstances. 
Is Damon justified? I think he is, and I suggest that any commonsense 
moralist who was not engaged in writing a philosophical discourse on 
promising would agree with me. So, I believe, would Pythias. Most phi- 
losophers, however, write as if promises could be broken only when the 
costs of keeping them would be very great, and by that standard Damon 
would not be entitled to break his promise. Watching others eat while 
you have a headache, mild nausea, and no appetite for food is a hardship, 
but it is not "very great." 
What would Harsanyi think about Damon's promise breaking? I take 
it there is no doubt that Damon and Pythias's agreement counts as an 
exchange of promises, whether or not they used the words "I promise." 
Harsanyi mentions agreements to meet one's friends at specified times 
and places as an example of the use of promising (sec. 2), and it is 
universally acknowledged that no particular form of words is necessary 
to making a promise. 
Harsanyi says that commonsense morality allows a promisor to break 
his promise "only in some rare and rather exceptional cases where keeping 
has to do with the degree to which people are willing to act on the basis of their expectations 
about how others will behave. See Harsanyi, sec. 2, andJohn C. Harsanyi, "Rule Utilitarianism 
and Decision Theory," Erkenntnis 11 (1977): 25-53, pp. 36-37. Since the incentive effect 
depends on the formation of expectations, I shall generally subsume both effects under 
the general rubric of expectations. I think there is only one point in my argument at which 
this conflation might matter (see n. 7 below). 
5. Donald H. Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-operation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). 
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Wed, 4 Dec 2013 10:38:04 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
60 Ethics October 1985 
his promise would cause him or some other people extreme hardship, 
or where the promisee would suffer only a very minor loss if the promise 
made to him were not fulfilled" (p. 44). Certainly Damon's meeting 
Pythias as agreed would not impose extreme hardship. So the issue becomes 
whether Pythias will suffer "only a very minor loss" if Damon does not 
turn up. If the loss to Pythias is too large to count as "very minor," then 
on Harsanyi's test Damon would have to keep his promise; and if I am 
right that commonsense morality would allow Damon to break the promise, 
then Harsanyi's test would not capture the commonsense view. So it 
seems that the loss to Pythias here must count as very minor. But if this 
is a very minor loss, there will be many cases in which promisors are 
allowed to break their promises on the ground that the loss to the promisee 
will be very minor. And that is inconsistent with Harsanyi's claim that 
commonsense morality allows promises to be broken only in "some rare 
and rather exceptional cases." 
It may seem that Harsanyi could avoid my present criticism by com- 
plicating his test just a bit. Instead of stating two excusing conditions in 
the alternative, one of which looks to the hardship to the promisor (or 
other people) and the other of which looks to the loss to the promise, 
perhaps the test should require that the hardship to the promisor (or 
others) and the loss to the promisee be considered together and balanced 
against each other by some mechanism that embodies a presumption in 
favor of keeping the promise. 
Certainly such a test would come closer to capturing commonsense 
promising, but it would not make Harsanyi's general view of promising 
tenable. The problem with his view is not that he fails to state a test that 
is perfect in detail. No one could do that. The problem, which came out 
in the last step of my discussion of his test as he states it, is his claim that 
commonsense morality allows promises to be broken only rarely. This, 
I think, is just not true. If I am right, then no test can capture commonsense 
promising which makes cases of justified promise breaking rare and 
exceptional. 
Like most philosophers who write about promising, Harsanyi overlooks 
the fact that commonsense promising is a subtle and flexible practice. 
Some promises are more important than others. Some promises are 
meant by the parties to be taken more seriously than others. We cannot 
state necessary and sufficient excusing conditions in terms of a specific 
level of hardship to the promisor or a specific level of loss to the promisee. 
Promising does not work that way. (Although I have discussed only one 
example, it should suggest a host of others to the reader.) Furthermore, 
it is the act utilitarian who is best able to give a philosophical account of 
the subtleties of promising because it is the act utilitarian who is most 
sensitive to the importance of circumstances.6 
6. Let me mention one other striking example of an overlooked subtlety in commonsense 
promising (recognizing that doing so takes me beyond the topics Harsanyi discusses). As 
I noted above, it is universally acknowledged that no particular form of words is necessary 
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Have I put too much weight on promises between friends or ac- 
quaintances? What about promises made in impersonal, commercial deal- 
ings? Surely those promises can be broken only rarely. I shall return to 
this point-I mention it now lest the reader become too impatient. But 
before I discuss it, there is more I want to say about Damon and Pythias. 
It might seem that if act utilitarianism (or commonsense morality 
for that matter) were as permissive as I say about promise breaking, then 
act utilitarians (or commonsense moralists) would not be able to rely on 
each other's undertakings. I believe they can rely on each other. Imagine 
that Damon and Pythias are both act utilitarians. On Friday, they make 
their date for lunch on Monday. Each believes on Friday that, barring 
unforeseen developments, their meeting for lunch on Monday will be 
the best available pattern ofjoint behavior. (From this it follows, incidentally, 
that each believes on Friday that, barring unforeseen developments, the 
best thing for him to do on Monday, if the other keeps the date, will be 
to keep it also.) Now, Monday arrives. Can Pythias rely on Damon to 
turn up for lunch? Of course he can. To see this, it is only necessary to 
be clear about the relevant sense of "reliance." 
If the question is whether Pythias can regard Damon's appearance 
as a cast-iron certainty, the answer is no. If the question is whether Pythias 
can assume that Damon will appear with a probability of 99 percent (or 
whatever probability would be guaranteed by most philosophers' over- 
stringent account of commonsense promising), the answer is still no. But 
these are questions of little importance. The most important question is 
whether Pythias can reasonably assume that he ought to go to the restaurant 
himself. Pythias's going, in the expectation of meeting Damon, would 
constitute reliance on Damon's undertaking in one standard sense of 
"reliance," and this is the sense of reliance that matters most. 
Should Pythias go? The obvious answer is yes. In order for it to be 
reasonable for Pythias to go, he does not have to know that Damon will 
certainly turn up, nor even that Damon will turn up with a probability 
of 99 percent. If the agreement was a sensible one when made on Friday, 
then in all likelihood Pythias should keep it as long as the probability of 
Damon's keeping it is, say, 50 percent or even somewhat less. We cannot 
be precise without more assumptions, but the point is clear: even if 
Damon will regard himself as excused by a minor hardship like his han- 
gover, and even if Pythias knows that, the probability that Damon will 
turn up is still far greater than the minimum probability necessary to 
for making a promise. Specifically, the words "I promise" are not necessary. But it does 
not follow at all that the precise words used are unimportant. In fact, use of the specific 
words "I promise" (or any of a few very close equivalents), while not necessary to the 
creation of a promise, normally increases the binding force of a promise. Use of those 
words constitutes an explicit acknowledgment by the promisor of the special importance 
to the promisee of this particular undertaking. There are many everyday contexts in which 
promises are made but in which use of the words "I promise," out of the blue, would be 
distinctly odd. Once we start thinking about just what words we use to make promises, 
and when and why, the nuances are legion. 
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justify Pythias in going to the restaurant-that is, to justify Pythias in 
"relying" in the sense that counts.7 
There is still a puzzle here. I say that Pythias should keep the date 
if there is at least a 50 percent chance (roughly) that Damon will keep 
it. But on what ground do we expect Damon to keep the date with even 
that probability? Well, Damon will keep the date (probably) because he 
expects Pythias to appear. But that is true only because Damon expects 
Pythias to expect that he, Damon, will appear. And so on. We may wonder 
whether these mutual expectations can be reciprocally justifying, as it 
seems they must be for the agreement to work. As I say, this is a puzzle, 
but someone who argued on the basis of this puzzle that agreements 
between act utilitarians could not work would not be making the same 
objection that Harsanyi makes. Harsanyi's claim is apparently just that 
the act utilitarian promisor would be excused too often for it to be rational 
for the promisee to rely. I have argued that that is not necessarily true. 
If we accept the point I have made in response to Harsanyi's specific 
claim, then we can see that there may be two different equilibrium sets 
of mutual expectations between Damon and Pythias. If they have made 
no agreement, each one expects the other to turn up at the Greek restaurant 
on Monday with only whatever probability is suggested by that other's 
normal dispositions with regard to independent choices about where to 
eat. We can assume that in such a case Pythias does not expect Damon 
to go to the restaurant with enough probability so that it makes sense 
for Pythias to go there unless he independently feels like it. And vice 
versa. If, on the other hand, they have made an agreement, Pythias can 
expect Damon to go to the restaurant with a substantially higher probability 
than in the absence of the agreement (and vice versa), and this can be 
true despite the fact that each understands the other will not go to the 
restaurant if some unforeseen event makes going even a minor hardship. 
So, it can be rational for Pythias (for example) to go, barring an unforeseen 
event creating hardship for himself, in the expectation of meeting Damon, 
even though Pythias knows Damon will regard himself as excused by an 
intervening occurrence that makes it better on balance that he (Damon) 
not go given the postagreement level of probability that Pythias will go. In 
short, there are, as I have said, two different possible equilibria of (act- 
utilitarian) expectations. (There might be more than two, but that does 
not matter for now.) The puzzle mentioned at the beginning of this long 
7. This is the point at which it might be important not to conflate the incentive effect 
and the expectation effect (see n. 4 above). Strictly speaking, what I argue for in the text 
is that Pythias will have sufficiently strong expectations to give him an adequate incentive 
to go to the restaurant. Even so, he may be slightly less confident of finding Damon there 
than he would be if he knew Damon was a rule-following promise keeper. Pythias may 
therefore lose some pleasure of anticipation. It seems to me that this slight loss in pleasure 
from anticipation (or, more generally, slight loss of confidence in one's predictions about 
one's own future) is likely to be outweighed by the case-by-case advantages that come from 
breaking promises when act utilitarianism says we should. 
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paragraph is just the puzzle of whether act utilitarians can move themselves 
from one such equilibrium to another by exchanging words, that is, by 
promising. Once we have got to this point, I think it is clear what we 
should say: it is an empirical question whether any particular group of 
act utilitarians have available to them a mechanism for moving between 
different equilibria of expectations; but since the expectations at both 
equilibria are completely act utilitarian, there is no logical reason why 
they should not possess such a mechanism.8 
Earlier, I left a loose end, the question, Do I put too much weight 
on how promising works between friends or between people who at least 
have special reasons for mutual trust? As Harsanyi suggests, promises 
may be made in situations ranging from casual arrangements between 
friends to impersonal commercial dealings. Perhaps the act utilitarian's 
account of promising does not make promissory obligation firm enough 
to be relied on in trade or banking, at the other end of the spectrum 
from Damon and Pythias. 
For present purposes, there are two principal differences between 
commercial transactions and dealings between friends. The less important 
difference is this: in a society in which the distribution of wealth does 
not conform to utilitarian principles, even a highly moral act utilitarian 
might sometimes attempt to secure a benefit for himself or another, in 
commerce, by an executory promise (a promise to be fulfilled at some 
future time) that he had no intention of fulfilling. This would not happen 
at all in a society organized completely according to utilitarian principles 
(nor, I assume, between friends in any society). It might happen, as I 
have said, in a society with a nonutilitarian distribution of wealth, but 
even here it would not happen often, for the simple reason that act 
utilitarians could not get away with this behavior very often without 
depriving themselves of the useful possibility of making promises they 
intended to keep.9 
The much more important difference between commercial dealings 
and dealings between friends is this: if Damon is a good act utilitarian, 
then Pythias knows it. But Damon's banker, or Sears, Roebuck, or a 
supplier of raw materials to Damon's small business, does not know it. 
How, then, shall these commercial parties rely on Damon's promise? 
There is a problem here, but it does not arise from Damon's being 
an act utilitarian. If Damon were instead a punctilious commonsense 
moral philosopher, who hardly ever broke a promise, how would Sears, 
Roebuck know it? They wouldn't. If commercial parties rely significantly 
on Damon's promises, it will normally be for one or more of the following 
reasons: (1) Damon deals repeatedly with a single promisee and thus has 
8. For a parallel discussion, see Regan, pp. 32-43. 
9. For my response to the argument that act utilitarians would be unable to take 
account of this loss of credibility because no individual false promise would have enough 
bad effects on act utilitarians' general credibility, see ibid., p. 67 and chap. 3. 
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a reputation to keep up. (2) Damon deals repeatedly with a class of 
promisees, of whom the particular promisee is one, who exchange in- 
formation, so that Damon has a reputation to keep up. Or, (3) Damon's 
promise will be legally enforceable. All three of these reasons can apply 
even if Damon is an act utilitarian. (An act utilitarian can be bound by, 
and in certain contexts he can even support, laws that impose obligations 
without fully act-utilitarian excusing conditions. Of course, such laws 
would have greatly diminished importance in a society organized on 
thoroughly utilitarian principles.) With regard to relatively trivial trans- 
actions, commercial dealers may rely to some extent on the fact that most 
people keep most of their promises most of the time. But, as we have 
seen, that also will be true even of act utilitarians. 
I hope I will not be taken as arguing that act utilitarianism and rule 
utilitarianism are really the same. I agree fully with Harsanyi that these 
are different theories, and I agree with him about what some of the 
differences are,1" for all that I disagree with his claims about promising 
and similar institutions. Also, nothing I say here in defense of act utili- 
tarianism should be taken to indicate a retreat from my belief that co- 
operative utilitarianism" is a better theory than either act or rule utili- 
tarianism. 
A CODA ON COORDINATION 
One matter on which Harsanyi and I disagree fundamentally is the 
importance and complexity of the coordination problem. He dismisses 
the coordination problem as unimportant, and he thinks that in any 
event it is easy to show that rule utilitarianism does better than act util- 
itarianism at promoting coordination (n. 5 and sec. 5). I think he is 
mistaken on both counts, and I think both mistakes have a common 
source. Harsanyi gives an incomplete answer to a question that has long 
been recognized as one of the main stumbling blocks for rule utilitarianism: 
granted that it would be best if everyone followed rule utilitarianism, 
what should I do if some people do not follow it? 
I do not suggest that Harsanyi overlooks this question. He addresses 
it both in his essay "Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory" and in his 
present essay. In "Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory" it is partly 
the recognition that some people will not follow whatever moral theory 
we decide is best that prompts Harsanyi's distinction between "flexible" 
and "rigid" agents.12 If we adopt rule utilitarianism, then the flexible 
agents are rule utilitarians, and each flexible agent selects and acts on 
the best joint strategy for all flexible agents given the behavior of the 
rigid agents. In the present essay, the flexible agents are in effect the 
10. Subject to what I say below in the Coda to this response, I agree with essentially 
everything in Harsanyi, "Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory," about the coordination 
effect (in Harsanyi's sense, i.e., as distinguished from the expectation and incentive effects). 
1 1. Regan, chaps. 8-10. 
12. Harsanyi, "Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory," pp. 34-35, 46-48. 
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people Harsanyi refers to as "all rational and morally motivated people" 
when he says the best code is the code that would maximize expected 
social utility when followed by those people (p. 44). 
So far so good. But there is a further problem. How is one flexible 
agent to identify the other flexible agents? This is important since the 
best thing for the flexible agents to do may depend on how many of 
them there are. As far as I can see, Harsanyi just takes it for granted in 
both his essays that everyone knows who is who-who is flexible and 
who is not."3 But the individual agent making a moral decision in the 
way Harsanyi recommends (if he does not jump over the whole process 
and simply assume that his society's existing moral code is the right one) 
must decide for himself who is flexible and who is not. As a practical 
matter, he will not do this before every decision, but the question does 
arise in principle in connection with any decision. 
This creates a further problem. Suppose we accept tentatively that 
the best theory for the flexible agents to follow is rule utilitarianism. The 
first thing an individual rule utilitarian must do, then, is to figure out 
who else is a rule utilitarian. Note that this must be the precise question 
he asks about other agents. No more general inquiry will do. It will not 
suffice, for example, to figure out who else is a person of good will in 
some broad sense, such as, who is rational by ordinary commonsense 
standards and generally benevolent. The reason is that somebody might 
be rational by ordinary commonsense standards and generally benevolent 
and still be an act utilitarian, a follower of W. D. Ross, or a believer in 
some religious ethical code. But the rule utilitarian cannot count on such 
people to join him in selecting and applying the best joint strategy for 
him and them (as flexible agents), given the behavior of everyone else 
(say, the egoists and people of unusually weak will). 
So, the first thing the individual rule utilitarian must do is identify 
the other rule utilitarians. But that means that the instructions to him 
are in fact a bit more complicated than merely, "Be a rule utilitarian." 
They are, "First figure out who the rule utilitarians are; then be a rule 
utilitarian." And, of course, it is important that the people the individual 
proposes to coordinate with (the other flexible agents) are also going 
through the same preliminary step, lest they make some false assumption 
about who is a rule utilitarian and is therefore flexible in the required 
sense. 
If we call ordinary rule utilitarianism R, we have seen that the individual 
cannot merely follow R. He must follow R', which says, "Figure out who 
13. Perhaps what Harsanyi takes for granted is not that everyone knows who's who 
but, rather, that every flexible agent has expectations about who should be treated as 
flexible and who should be treated as rigid (see Harsanyi, "Rule Utilitarianism and Decision 
Theory," p. 47). In some contexts it would matter whether one assumed knowledge or only 
expectations, but I don't think it does for present purposes, since what I go on to discuss 
in the text is the question how the relevant expectations could rationally be formed and 
indeed whether there is any way they could be rationally formed. 
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else is following R; then follow R with them." Or rather, since the others 
must also go through the preliminary step, what R' must actually say is, 
"Figure out who else is following R'; then follow R with them." Unfor- 
tunately, the instructions that are supposed to constitute R' now contain 
within them a reference to R'. Can this self-reference be avoided? Can 
we spell out what the individual agent must do, including what he must 
do to identify the other agents it is sensible for him to try to coordinate 
with, in such a way that there is no vicious regress? 
It was in demonstrating that we can provide an appropriate set of 
instructions, at least in principle, that I produced two very convoluted 
chapters in my book, which assume what Harsanyi correctly characterizes 
as "completely unreal conditions" (n. 5). I still regard it as worthwhile to 
have shown that the problem is solvable in principle. Harsanyi may of 
course disagree. In any event, those chapters were the best I could do 
by way of dealing with what we might call the "identification problem"- 
the problem of how to build into our instructions to an individual who 
wants to cooperate the essential first step of deciding who else is cooperating. 
That is a genuine problem, which I believe Harsanyi does not address. 
Although Harsanyi does not address this problem, I said in Utili- 
tarianism and Co-operation that he had come closer to addressing it than 
anyone before him,14 and I meant that to be a favorable comment. The 
lucidity of his discussion of the coordination problem, rescinding from 
the identification problem, highlighted much better than any previous 
discussion just what remained to be done. However, I went on to do 
Harsanyi an injustice by treating him as if he also meant to deal with 
the identification problem. Assuming (falsely, I now believe) that he 
meant to address the identification problem (and to solve it by identifying 
the rigid agents with those whose behavior could be predicted), I attempted 
to explain briefly why his suggestions did not solve the problem (hardly 
surprising, if he was not trying to). In the process I made some arguments 
that are misguided and unjust if they are taken as criticisms of Harsanyi's 
treatment of the coordination problem (identification aside).15 I apologize. 
To return very briefly to my observations at the beginning of this 
coda, I suspect there are two reasons why I regard the coordination 
problem as more important than Harsanyi does. One reason is that, 
treating the identification problem as part of the coordination problem, 
I see many more tacit coordination problems than he does.16 Voting and 
tax paying, indeed all matters involving obedience or disobedience to 
some general statute or regulation, present coordination problems that 
are "tacit" in the sense that they are not fully solved even by explicit 
agreement or legislation. In principle, the identification problem always 
remains. It is simply not susceptible of solution by fiat, whether it be the 
14. Regan, p. 260, n. 7. 
15. Ibid. 
16. He says they are "rather rare and unimportant" (p. 48). 
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fiat of agreeing parties or the fiat of a legislator. Even in the simplest 
case, where two parties have made a face-to-face agreement, the question 
remains for each, Will the other follow it? In that sense, every coordination 
problem has an ineliminable tacit aspect.17 
The other reason I think the coordination problem is more important 
than Harsanyi does is that I do not think the coordination effect and the 
expectation and incentive effects can be separated as completely as Harsanyi 
tries to separate them. Believing that act utilitarians can influence ex- 
pectations and incentives by behavior such as promising, I also believe 
that for act utilitarians the problem of generating desirable expectations 
and incentives is itself a coordination problem and an important one. 
Moreover, if non-rule utilitarians must identify rule utilitarians and infer 
what rule utilitarians really believe at least in part from the rule utilitarians' 
behavior, then it seems to me that the problem of generating expectations 
and incentives is a coordination problem for rule utilitarians also. 
17. I mention the problem of obedience to statutory and regulatory schemes only 
because almost every such scheme points to some coordination problem. It might seem 
that coordination is guaranteed in such cases without any specific thought by any individual 
of the desirability of coordination, since each individual is given adequate incentives for 
correct behavior by the threat of legal penalties. But the law could not function in the face 
of really widespread disobedience. The majority of people keep the system going by co- 
operating in obedience; and the penalties deter the remainder (insofar as they are effective). 
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